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Two recurrent concerns in discussions on an embodied view of cognition are the “necessity 
question” (i.e., is activation in modality-specific brain areas necessary for language comprehension?) 
and the “simulation constraint” (i.e., how do we understand language for which we lack the 
relevant experiences?). In the present paper we argue that the criticisms encountered by the 
embodied approach hinge on a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment. We argue that the 
data relating sensorimotor activation to language comprehension can best be interpreted as 
supporting a non-representationalist, enactivist model of language comprehension, according 
to which language comprehension can be described as procedural knowledge – knowledge 
how, not knowledge that – that enables us to interact with others in a shared physical world. 
The enactivist view implies that the activation of modality-specific brain areas during language 
processing reflects the employment of sensorimotor skills and that language comprehension 
is a context-bound phenomenon. Importantly, an enactivist view provides an embodied 
approach of language, while avoiding the problems encountered by a cognitivist interpretation 
of embodiment.
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understanding (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005; Jacob, 2009) and that 
neural resonance does not amount to simulation (Gallagher, 2007; 
Zahavi, 2008), skeptics of an embodied approach to language com-
prehension argue that neural resonance is neither necessary nor suf-
ficient for language comprehension (Bedny et al., 2008; Mahon and 
Caramazza, 2008; Postle et al., 2008; Toni et al., 2008; Kemmerer and 
Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010). In addition, it is unclear how an embod-
ied approach to cognition can account for the understanding of 
concepts or actions that we have never experienced ourselves.
We state that these problems for an embodied approach to 
language comprehension hinge on a cognitivist, representational-
ist understanding of embodied cognition. Tackling them requires 
switching to an enactivist paradigm of cognition. Cognitivism is 
here defined as the theoretical approach that attempts to explain 
cognition in terms of the manipulation of discrete internal rep-
resentations. Although on this account cognition may be used 
for the purpose of guiding actions, the cognitive process as such 
is thought of in terms that do not essentially involve the actions 
that it may help to guide. Cognition understood as the manipula-
tion of internal representations is supposed to mediate between 
perception and action. But although it is enabled by perception 
and used for action, neither perception, nor action is constitutive 
of it. By contrast, enactivism can be defined as the view that cog-
nition emerges in the interaction between an organism and the 
environment, such that perception and action are co-constitutive 
of it. Cognition is manifested in the kind of appropriate, dynamic 
perception–action coupling that allows us to cope effectively with 
our physical and social environment. On the enactivist view it 
is  misleading  to  think  of  such  coupling  as  requiring  discrete 
IntroductIon
One of the most exciting discoveries in cognitive neuroscience over 
the last decades is certainly the finding that our brain “resonates” 
to certain classes of stimuli. Observing the actions of others, for 
instance, activates brain areas comparable to the areas that are acti-
vated when one would perform these actions oneself (Rizzolatti 
et al., 1996; Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Grafton, 2009). But neural 
resonance is not limited to action perception and social interac-
tion. In this paper we will focus on neural resonance in language 
comprehension. Following the notion of communicative motor 
resonance during speech perception (the motor theory of speech 
perception, for overview, see Galantucci et al., 2006), several studies 
have shown that reading verbs referring to concrete action results in 
the recruitment of effector-specific regions of primary motor and 
premotor cortex, comparable to the activation observed when mov-
ing the effector most strongly associated with these actions (Hauk 
and Pulvermuller, 2004; Pulvermuller et al., 2005; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 
2006; Boulenger et al., 2009).
The theoretical significance of these findings is a matter of ongo-
ing debate. Those who incline toward an embodied approach to 
cognition claim that resonance mechanisms support language com-
prehension by providing an internal representation of described 
actions or events (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 2010). Parallel to the 
simulationist interpretation of neural resonance in social cogni-
tion (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Goldman, 
2006) such representations may consist in the re-enactment of 
these actions (Zwaan and Madden, 2005; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; 
Zwaan, 2009). However, just like some have pointed out that reso-
nance mechanisms are neither necessary nor sufficient for action Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    December 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 234  |  2
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for the idea that the processing of language is accompanied by the 
activation of modality-specific brain regions. For instance, reading 
action verbs or sentences describing action-related language con-
sistently results in the activation of motor-related brain areas (Hauk 
and Pulvermuller, 2004; Pulvermuller et al., 2005; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 
2006; Boulenger et al., 2009), whereas the reading of words referring 
to concrete semantic concepts (e.g., animals or fruits) has been asso-
ciated with increased activation in visual areas (Martin et al., 1996; 
van Schie et al., 2003). In sum, these studies support the assumption 
that the processing of linguistic concepts recruits modality-specific 
brain areas and on the basis of these findings it has been suggested 
that concepts are represented in brain areas comparable to those 
used for perception and action (Barsalou, 2008).
Two recurrent problems for the embodied approach to language are 
the “necessity question” and the “simulation constraint.” The “neces-
sity question” is the question whether activation in modality-specific 
brain areas during language processing is necessary for language 
comprehension or whether it should be considered as an epiphe-
nomenon (e.g., post-lexical simulation). In other words: if language 
is truly grounded in sensorimotor areas, we should expect language 
processing to break down if the activation of sensorimotor areas is 
disrupted. Unfortunately, the data from studies with patients showing 
category-specific deficits in association with damage to sensorimo-
tor areas is still inconclusive (for review, see Mahon and Caramazza, 
2009). Similarly, data from TMS studies that have attempted to dis-
rupt processing in motor areas during the reading of action verbs has 
provided only mixed results, with some studies showing early effects 
in the motor system during reading action-related sentences (Oliveri 
et al., 2004; Buccino et al., 2005), while other studies only observed 
effects during the later stages of word processing or during explicit 
motor imagery (Tomasino et al., 2008; Papeo et al., 2009). In addition, 
although some studies have reported somatotopic-specific effects in 
the motor system when reading verbs referring to specific effectors 
(Hauk and Pulvermuller, 2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005; Aziz-Zadeh 
et al., 2006; Boulenger et al., 2009), other studies have pointed out that 
a strict overlap between the activation of motor areas during action 
execution and the reading of actions verbs has never been directly 
demonstrated (Postle et al., 2008; Kemmerer and Gonzalez-Castillo, 
2010). Thus, although there is some evidence for the involvement of 
motor resonance in language comprehension, at present it is unclear 
how and when exactly activation in motor areas supports language 
comprehension.
The “simulation  constraint”  poses  another,  more  principled 
problem for embodied approaches to language. If language compre-
hension involves the re-enactment of our own sensorimotor experi-
ences, it remains unclear how we can understand language for which 
we lack the relevant simulations. For instance, how do we understand 
actions that are beyond our own motor repertoire, such as animal 
actions or how do we understand language that is unrelated to the 
concrete sensorimotor domain, such as abstract words like “love,” 
“war,” or “justice”? Although several attempts have been made to 
provide an embodied account of the representation of abstract con-
cepts (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg et al., 2008; Glenberg, 2010), most 
research supporting the embodied approach of language has focused 
selectively on the processing of language referring to concrete actions 
or objects (Hauk and Pulvermuller, 2004; Pulvermuller et al., 2005; 
Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Boulenger et al., 2009).
  representations of one’s   environment: effectively dealing with one’s 
environment does not presuppose awareness of features of one’s 
environment, rather it reflects such awareness. Enactivism implies 
that cognition is essentially tied to action and that cognition is 
always context-bound.
In the present paper, drawing a parallel with the recent enactiv-
ist criticism of the simulation interpretation of the mirror neuron 
system, we argue that the data relating sensorimotor activation 
to language comprehension can best be interpreted as support-
ing a non-representationalist, enactivist model of language com-
prehension. We will start by outlining evidence from cognitive 
neuroscience in favor of an embodied approach to language com-
prehension and by elaborating on the problems such an approach 
faces. We will then briefly turn to a parallel with the debate on the 
function of the mirror neuron system and highlight the recent 
enactivist move made in that debate. After having contrasted the 
enactivist cognition paradigm with the current cognitivist para-
digm in cognitive neuroscience, we will introduce a similar move 
in the present context and discuss how an enactivist approach to 
embodied language comprehension can deal with the objections 
to an embodied approach to language comprehension. We will 
conclude with a discussion on the perspectives and limitations of 
the enactive approach to language and discuss the prospective for 
future research on language and embodiment.
EmbodImEnt and languagE comprEhEnsIon
What exactly does it mean to say that “cognition is embodied”? 
In cognitive neuroscience, theories of embodied cognition often 
seem to imply that cognition is embodied, because it recruits neu-
ral resources comparable to those used in perception and action. 
For instance, according to Barsalou’s (1999) perceptual symbol 
systems, concepts have a perceptual basis and the recruitment of 
concepts involves the re-enactment of perceptual experiences in 
sensorimotor areas of the brain (see also Prinz, 2002). Similarly, 
in social cognition it has been argued that action understanding 
employs a process of motor simulation, involving brain struc-
tures comparable to those involved when one would perform the 
observed action oneself (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti 
et al., 2001; Goldman, 2006). Central to these embodied theories 
is the idea that cognition is grounded in relevant perceptual or 
motor simulations.
The notion that the processing of concepts is accompanied by 
activation in modality-specific brain areas is supported by a number 
of studies (for review, see Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Borghi and 
Cimatti, 2010). Behavioral studies support the idea that semantic 
processing recruits modality-specific resources. In a property verifi-
cation study, for instance, participants were found to respond faster 
if the preceding word represented properties from the same instead 
of a different modality (e.g., gustatory, auditory, or visual; Pecher 
et al., 2003). In addition, the recruitment of modality-specific sys-
tems is found to extend beyond the word level, to the processing of 
semantics at the sentence-level. For instance, after reading sentences 
describing an agent viewing an object in a specific context, partici-
pants were faster in identifying pictures that were congruent with 
the situation described in the sentence (e.g., faster verification of 
visually degraded pictures when the context refers to fog; Yaxley and 
Zwaan, 2007). Neuroimaging studies have provided further support www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 234  |  3
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motor system, mirror neuron activation should be conceived of 
as reflecting the employment of sensorimotor skills. More specifi-
cally, activation of mirror neurons should be considered an integral 
part of the process of perceiving and responding to other’s actions. 
In some cases this may require a covert response (e.g., perceiving 
other’s action goals), in other cases a more overt reaction may be 
required (e.g., catching a team player’s ball). What these cases have 
in common and what is a central notion of the enactive paradigm 
is that perceiving is an active process (Noë, 2004).
What is interesting about this recent enactivist move, in the 
context of our present discussion, is the fact that a simulationist 
interpretation of the function of mirror neurons is rejected (see, 
however, Slors, 2009) while their contribution to social cognition is 
still viewed from an embodied perspective. In order to see whether 
a similar move can be made with respect to resonance phenomena 
in language comprehension, we need to turn to the dominant cogni-
tivism in current embodied approaches to language comprehension 
and the possible enactivist alternative.
cognItIvIsm vErsus EnactIvIsm
In philosophy, embodied cognition is usually conceived of as an 
alternative  for  cognitivism,  where “cognitivism”  stands  for  an 
approach to cognition in terms of the rule- or algorithm-based 
manipulation of discrete internal representations of the world 
(Brooks, 1991; Clark, 1991, 1997; Gallagher, 2005; Gibbs, 2005; 
Rowlands, 2006; Chemero, 2009). In cognitive neuroscience, how-
ever, embodied approaches to cognition are in an important sense 
still fully cognitivist. Their main quarrel with traditional approaches 
to cognition is not about whether cognition should be thought 
of in terms of representations, but about how we should think 
of these representations. Contrary to traditional cognitivism, the 
embodied approach argues that the vehicle used for representing 
concepts is sensorimotor in nature (cf. Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan and 
Madden, 2005; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Mahon and Caramazza, 
2008; Glenberg, 2010). In cognitive neuroscience the notion that 
concepts are embodied primarily means that there is a correspond-
ence between the brain activations associated with processing the 
referent of a concept and the processing of the concept itself. For 
instance, seeing a car and thinking or reading about a car involves 
the activation in comparable visual areas. Thus, the dispute between 
modal and amodal theories of language comprehension is basically 
a discussion about the representational vehicle of concepts (i.e., 
whether the representational vehicle of concepts is shared with 
neural resources used for perception and action). Both modal and 
amodal theories of language thus share a cognitivist notion of cog-
nition in terms of discrete internal representations of the world.
This often applied representationalist notion of embodiment 
in cognitive neuroscience implies an important break from philo-
sophical approaches to embodied cognition, which emphasize that 
cognition should be understood in terms of the dynamical inter-
action between an organism and its environment (Varela et al., 
1991; Hurley, 1998; O’Regan and Noe, 2001; Noë, 2004; Gallagher, 
2005; Thompson, 2007; Chemero, 2009). We refer to these diverse 
approaches as “enactivist.” A defining feature of the enactivist 
paradigm of cognition is that it challenges the representational-
ism of the traditional cognitivist paradigm by taking cognition to 
be based on “knowing how” instead of “knowing that.” That is, an 
Our aim in the remainder of this paper is to sketch a way of 
  giving up on the simulation constraint, while retaining an embod-
ied approach to language comprehension. In addition, we will 
speculate on the consequences for the necessity question.
IntErludE: a parallEl wIth thE mIrror nEuron dEbatE
In order to see how we can reject the simulation constraint while 
retaining an embodied approach to language comprehension, it is 
helpful to look at recent developments in an adjacent debate, the 
debate in social cognition on the function of the mirror neuron 
system. Mirror neuron activity has often been interpreted as rep-
resenting simulations of perceived goal-directed actions for the 
purpose of grasping the intentions and emotions “behind” those 
actions (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; 
Goldman, 2006; Gallese, 2007). The simulation interpretation of 
mirror neurons is controversial. One line of criticism is put for-
ward by critics of embodied approaches to social cognition. It is 
argued that mirror neuron based simulation is at best sufficient to 
retrace motor intentions, while attribution of higher-level inten-
tions (so-called “prior intentions”; Searle, 1983) requires much 
more elaborate cognitive activity (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005; Saxe, 
2005, 2009; Jacob, 2008). The point is that one type of movement 
may be recruited to carry out various higher-level intentions. It 
is also argued that mirror neuron activity is not necessary for the 
attribution of intentions. People attribute intentions, for instance, 
to moving geometric shapes in the famous Heider and Simmel 
(1944) movies and it is difficult to imagine how body-specific 
motor simulations could underlie this intention attribution (see 
also Castelli et al., 2002).
These arguments are intended to downplay the role of neu-
ral resonance in social cognition and hence to oppose embodied 
approaches to social cognition. However, they can also be taken seri-
ously without abandoning an embodied view. Recently a number 
of philosophers have argued that mirror neurons may be part of 
larger neural processes underlying social perception, i.e., the direct 
pick-up of basic intentions and emotions in the conduct of other 
people (Gallagher, 2007; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008; Zahavi, 2008; 
Hutto, 2009). Mirror neurons, according to these philosophers, 
need not be interpreted as coding for the re-enactment of the initi-
ating stages of the other’s action. Rather, they should be interpreted 
as contributing to the processing of the perceived behavior of others 
for the direct purpose of social interaction. The idea here is to think 
of social perception as an enactive process involving sensorimotor 
skills and not as mere sensory input processing. This idea is bor-
rowed from enactive theories of perception according to which 
perception involves active engagement with the world rather than 
mere passive reception of information from the environment (cf. 
Hurley, 1998; Noë, 2004). The enactivist interpretation of neural 
resonance in social cognition fits well with the fact that many mir-
ror neurons are broadly congruent to an observed action, rather 
than strictly congruent (Fogassi and Gallese, 2002; Csibra, 2005) 
and with the finding that mirror neurons fire during cooperative 
tasks in which one’s own movements need to be complementary 
rather than imitative relative to the actions of the person one needs 
to cooperate with (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007). Thus accord-
ing to an enactivist account, rather than reflecting a simulation 
process involving the mapping of observed actions onto one’s own Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    December 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 234  |  4
van Elk et al.  An enactivist paradigm of language
(Elman, 1990; Port, 2003). Surprisingly, these approaches are largely 
ignored in recent discussions on the embodiment of language in 
cognitive neuroscience. Vice versa, recent findings in cognitive 
neuroscience showing the involvement of modality-specific brain 
areas during language processing have hardly been incorporated by 
enactivists or in dynamical models. This lack of cross talk is prob-
ably related to the incommensurable paradigms in the respective 
fields of research. Embodied cognition in cognitive neuroscience 
uses the cognitivist paradigm and has thus been concerned pri-
marily with explaining how meaning is represented in the brain 
(Barsalou, 1999; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Mahon and Caramazza, 
2008; Zwaan, 2009). By contrast, approaches to language that fit the 
enactivist paradigm are typically anti-representationalist and focus 
primarily on those aspects of language that allow for a dynamical 
explanation, such as speech rhythms (Port, 2003), syntax (Elman, 
1990, 1995) or the functioning of language at an inter-individual 
level (Clark, 2006; Beckner et al., 2009).
an EnactIvIst approach to languagE comprEhEnsIon
In this section we shall briefly sketch the contours of an enactivist 
conception of language comprehension. We will then argue that 
this conception fits the neuroscientific data on embodiment and 
language better than a cognitivist embodied cognition approach 
in terms of modal representations and motor simulations. Finally 
and most importantly, we will argue that the enactivist conception 
of language comprehension provides an embodied approach to 
language comprehension that avoids the necessity question and 
the simulation constraint.
An enactivist approach to language comprehension implies that 
language, ultimately, is used for action and social interaction. This 
means that linguistic utterances acquire their meaning in context 
and not merely as a function of syntax and semantics. When you are 
sitting in a restaurant and your partner asks you “Can you give me 
the salt?” you do not reply by saying “yes,” although that would be 
the correct answer if syntax and semantics were all that matters. The 
speech act of your partner directs you to perform a certain action 
(Searle, 1969). Instead of asking for the salt, your partner could have 
pointed toward the salt as well to make the same request. Or sup-
pose you are sitting in the restaurant again and the waiter asks you 
whether you would like anything for desert. You respond by saying 
that you are fine and that you would like to pay the bill. In this case, 
your response to the waiter’s request follows a linguistic conven-
tion in a script-like fashion (Schank and Abelson, 1977). In both 
examples, language comprehension can be accurately described as 
the procedural knowledge how to respond in certain situations to 
specific utterances. On the enactivist account this notion of lan-
guage comprehension is paradigmatic; it can be extended to cover 
many or even most instances of language comprehension. Learning 
to understand language is learning how to couple specific linguistic 
inputs to specific actions. These actions may be immediate but 
they may also be in the more distant future (e.g., as in understand-
ing the sentence “the election will be on May the 5th”). They may 
also be only “virtual” in the sense that understanding an utterance 
only involves being disposed to act in certain ways given certain 
circumstances. Of course in many instances responding appro-
priately to an utterance is responding linguistically. But linguistic 
practice is not free floating – it is a practice of embodied beings in 
  organism’s knowledge of its environment is not taken to consist in 
the adequate representation or internal modeling of environmental 
features. Rather, knowledge consists in the way sensory informa-
tion is linked to motor output. The structuring and restructuring 
of sensorimotor links in the recursive interaction of an organism 
with its environment, by means of which the organism adapts to it, 
implies or specifies knowledge of the world. Thus, in the enactiv-
ist paradigm, the fact that knowledge is essentially embodied and 
embedded involves its being non-representational (see, however, 
Hutto, 2005). Knowledge – cognition – as the American naturalist 
Dewey (1896) pointed out, cannot be understood by breaking it 
into parts; it always exists at the level of the situated organism as 
a whole (Ryle, 1949; Dennett, 1969). With its roots in Gibsonian 
ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979) an important branch of enac-
tivism focuses on a non-representationalist account of perception 
based on so-called “sensorimotor contingencies” (Hurley, 1998; 
O’Regan and Noe, 2001; Noë, 2004). There are interesting connec-
tions here with earlier developments in Robotics. Brooks (1991), 
for instance, showed that robots without a central processor or an 
internal map of the environment can successfully move around due 
to independent “perception–action modules” that act directly on 
the incoming information. These approaches to cognition essen-
tially highlight the direct coupling between perception and action, 
without invoking representations as an explanatory variable. Thus, 
the enactivist view rejects the notion of “shared representations” 
between language processing and sensorimotor processing.
Another branch of enactivism focuses on the continuity between 
mind and life by arguing that living is itself a cognitive process. A liv-
ing being creates and maintains its own domain of meaningfulness 
by generating and maintaining its own self-identity as an embodied 
organism (Thompson, 2007). Again, the embodiment of cognition 
is taken to imply a non-representationalist notion of cognition. The 
mind is not seen as a complex system of cognitive cogs and levers, 
but rather as unified whole, an organism, whose cognitive feats 
can be described in terms of the non-linear dynamics of dynamic 
systems theory (Varela et al., 1991; see for applications in cognitive 
neuroscience: Thelen, 1994; Beer, 2000). Dynamical systems theory 
provides a model of cognition that consists of “a set of quantifiable 
variables changing continually, concurrently and interdependently 
over time in accordance with dynamical laws that can, in principle, 
be described by some set of equations” (Chemero, 2009). Initially, 
dynamical systems theory was applied to model relatively simple 
motor behaviors, such as walking (Thelen, 1994), finger wagging 
(Haken et al., 1985; Schoner and Kelso, 1988), or the social coupling 
of motor behavior (Schmidt et al., 1990; Richardson et al., 2007). 
In addition, dynamical approaches have been applied to model 
higher-level cognition as well, such as the A-not-B error (Thelen 
et al., 2001), categorical perception (Beer, 2000) and mathematical 
problem solving (Stephen et al., 2009a,b). Central to dynamical 
models is the assumption that seemingly complex behavior can be 
accurately described with relatively simple mathematical models, 
such as coupled oscillators or dynamic fields.
Several authors have argued for an approach to language com-
prehension that fits the enactive paradigm of cognition, broadly 
conceived (Barwise and Perry, 1981, 1983; Clark, 2006; Beckner et al., 
2009) or have applied dynamical systems modeling to language per-
ception (Pollack, 1991; Port et al., 1995; Port, 2003), and production www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 234  |  5
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context, whereas motor features are more strongly activated when 
the word is presented in an action context. Similarly, in another 
study we found that a word’s long-term semantic associations can 
be selectively overruled when the word is used in a different context 
(van Elk et al., 2009b). For instance, whereas the concept “cup” is 
strongly associated to the word “mouth,” this semantic associa-
tion can be overruled if one intends to use the cup in an unusual 
fashion (e.g., bring the cup toward the eye), thereby underlining 
the flexibility and context-dependence of language use. Moreover, 
these findings argue against a cognitivist interpretation of embodi-
ment, according to which sensorimotor activation during language 
processing reflects the activation of representations, specifying the 
core meaning of concrete words. Thereby the enactive paradigm 
to language differs in important ways from previous theories that 
have argued that language is primarily for action (Glenberg, 1997; 
see also Borghi and Cimatti, 2010), but that still maintained the 
notion of internal simulation processes underlying language under-
standing. As pointed out, these approaches run into the simulation 
constraint and the necessity question that the enactivist paradigm 
tries to avoid, by avoiding the notion of internal simulations.
Another  important  advantage  of  an  enactivist  approach  to 
embodied language comprehension over a cognitivist approach 
is that it accounts for a broad range of action-related effects dur-
ing language processing that need not be restricted to simulation, 
re-enactment, or pre-enactment. Thus it can accommodate find-
ings that are harder to interpret in cognitivist terms. For instance, 
in a recent study we found a stronger motor resonance for verbs 
describing animal actions compared to human actions (van Elk 
et al., 2010). If motor resonance is primarily related to the famil-
iarity of the action, we should have expected a stronger motor 
activation for human actions, as the way in which most animals 
move is clearly different from the way in which humans move. In 
contrast, animals only have a very limited action repertoire (e.g., a 
duck can “swim,” “squeak,” or “fly”), whereas humans can perform 
many different actions. Accordingly, actions are easier to predict 
for animals than for humans and the stronger motor resonance for 
animal actions fits well with the idea that motor resonance is used 
for action prediction (van Elk et al., 2010). In another study it was 
found that making a lexical decision about verbs and imagining 
the actions described by these verbs are two neurally dissociable 
processes, involving activation in different regions of premotor 
cortex (Willems et al., 2010). This finding argues against a strict 
simulationist interpretation of motor resonance as well, but goes 
well with the enactivist view: making a decision about whether a 
string of letters represents a word and imaging the action described 
by a word are two different skills that involve different regions of 
premotor cortex. These studies underline the importance of sen-
sorimotor activation for language processing but they cannot be 
accounted for merely in terms of simulation or re-enactment.
In an enactivist account of language comprehension, the simula-
tion constraint mentioned in Section “Embodiment and Language 
Comprehension” is absent. That is, on an enactivist account the idea 
that language comprehension is embodied is not exhausted by the 
idea that the processing of action words involves re-enactment or 
pre-enactment of the described action. Thus, the fact that many 
instances of language comprehension are hard to conceive of in 
terms of simulation – either because utterances involve actions 
a physical world. As Wittgenstein (1953) held, understanding the 
meaning of a word is knowing how it can be used. And this use 
always takes place within a social context involving the pragmatics 
of interacting embodied persons. In short, on an enactivist account, 
language comprehension can be described as procedural knowledge 
– knowledge how, not knowledge that – that enables us to interact 
with others in a shared physical world.
The enactivist view implies that language comprehension should 
be studied in relation to its potential for action. Thus, the brain 
activations associated with language processing do not mirror a 
representation-based inference process. In contrast, the activation 
of modality-specific brain areas during language processing should 
be conceived of as reflecting the employment of sensorimotor skills. 
On this account, the motor activation that has been found in asso-
ciation with the processing of action verbs or words referring to 
manipulable objects likely supports action prediction or anticipa-
tion. For instance, in the sentence “Can you give me the salt?” the 
motor activation in relation to the processing of the word “give” 
may prepare the listener for a subsequent grasping action (Zwaan 
and Kaschak, 2009) and the motor activation in association with 
the processing of words like “cup,” “scissors,” or “hammer” may 
reflect the retrieval of conceptual knowledge to enable the subse-
quent (virtual) interaction with the object (cf. van Elk et al., 2009a; 
Rueschemeyer et al., 2010). Similarly, perceptual resonance during 
language processing may reflect a pattern completion inference 
process used for prediction (see also Barsalou, 2009). For instance, 
the activation in visual areas that accompanies the processing of 
words referring to concrete concepts may support the categorical 
perception of behaviorally relevant categories (Ward, 2009), such 
as in “look, there’s an eagle up in the sky” (Zwaan et al., 2002) or 
may facilitate the retrieval of relevant contextual information that 
allows one to make inferences and predictions about objects and 
situations (Barsalou et al., 2003; Barsalou, 2009).
An advantage of an enactive approach is that it allows for the 
fact that language comprehension is a context-bound phenom-
enon that is dependent on the relation between the organism and 
the context in which the organism is acting. Cognitivist embod-
ied approaches often make the implicit assumption that there is a 
core meaning of words that can be specified in terms of a specific 
representational vehicle. More specifically, cognitivist embodied 
approaches to language processing seem to imply that the sen-
sorimotor representations that are activated in association with 
the processing of words occur relatively fast, automatic, and in 
a bottom-up fashion (Pulvermuller, 2005). The idea is that word 
reading results in the spreading of activation throughout a network 
of associated sensorimotor features, thereby constituting the mean-
ing of the word. However, in one context, the motor activation 
associated with the processing of, e.g., the word “pass” may specify 
a specific action tendency, such as with the speech act “please pass 
me the salt,” whereas, in another context a different motor activa-
tion will be involved, such as in the utterance “pass me the ball” in 
a soccer game. In line with the idea that meaning is context-bound, 
recent studies indicate that the sensorimotor features that are co-
activated in association with the processing of words are indeed 
dependent on the context in which the word is presented (Hoenig 
et al., 2008; van Dam et al., 2010). For instance, the word “tennis 
ball” primarily activates visual features when presented in a visual Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    December 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 234  |  6
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scopE and lImItatIons of thE EnactIvE approach
An important question is to what extent the enactive paradigm 
can scale up the requirements of a full-blown theory of high-level 
cognition. It has repeatedly been argued that the enactive model 
works relatively well when it comes to explaining lower level senso-
rimotor processes, but that so-called “representation-hungry prob-
lems” (Clark, 1997) are more difficult to explain within an enactive 
framework (see, however, van Rooij et al., 2002; Chemero, 2009).
In the present context, it is especially relevant to consider if 
and how the enactive paradigm can account for the processing of 
abstract words. First of all, we would like to point out that our aim 
was primarily to show how the enactive approach circumvents the 
problems associated with a cognitivist interpretation of sensori-
motor activation during the processing of concrete words. When 
it comes to the processing of abstract concepts we have to be more 
careful. As discussed before, several attempts have been made to 
provide an embodied account of abstract word meaning (Barsalou, 
1999; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Glenberg et al., 2008; Borghi and 
Cimatti, 2009; Glenberg, 2010. It has been repeatedly pointed out, 
for instance, that many abstract concepts bear a direct relation to 
the concrete domain, such as words referring to divine concepts 
(Meier et al., 2007), words describing power relations (Schubert, 
2005) and even words referring to numbers (Dehaene et al., 1993). 
Typically, the relation between the abstract and the concrete domain 
is conceived as abstract words being linked to concrete sensorimo-
tor representations. For instance, it has been argued that numbers 
are spatially represented in the brain along a “mental number line” 
(Moyer and Landauer, 1967; Dehaene et al., 1993). Although the 
enactive view acknowledges the idea that many abstract concepts 
are related to concrete sensorimotor experiences, it rejects the view 
that this relation can be identified at a brain level, in the form of 
specific neural representations. Similar to the enactive approach to 
concrete words, the processing of abstract words should always be 
considered in relation to its potential for action. For instance, the 
observed relation between number words and space may be part of 
a common magnitude system that is used both for perception and 
action (Walsh, 2003). In line with this suggestion, it has been found 
that number processing influences action planning, such that large 
numbers facilitate power grips and small numbers facilitate preci-
sion grips (Lindemann et al., 2007). Similarly, action compatibility 
effects in association with the processing of words with a positive 
or negative valence may reflect approach and avoidance tenden-
cies (see for instance van Dantzig et al., 2008). In sum, although 
the enactive paradigm proposed in the present paper is primarily 
intended as an alternative to a cognitivist interpretation of neural 
resonance during language processing, one could conceive a simi-
lar approach in considering abstract concepts in relation to their 
potential for action (see for instance Borghi and Cimatti, 2009).
Another possible limitation of the enactive paradigm concerns 
the costs associated with abandoning sensorimotor simulations 
in language processing. It has been argued that perceptual sym-
bols and sensorimotor simulations allow for the systematicity and 
productivity of thought (Barsalou et al., 2003). For instance, it 
has been argued that simulations allow one to make inferences 
beyond the information that is directly available. In addition, con-
cepts can be combined into more complex concepts, via a selec-
tive process of merging existing simulations (e.g., Prinz, 2002). 
that are beyond our own motor repertoire, or because they are 
unrelated to the concrete sensorimotor domain – need not be an 
impediment to an embodied account of them. Hence, switching 
from a cognitivist to an enactivist paradigm of cognition effectively 
deals with an important objection to an embodied approach to 
language comprehension.
In the case of the necessity question a solution can be conceived 
of along similar lines. The necessity question starts from the implicit 
assumption that a core meaning of words can be specified and 
the critical issue is whether this core meaning is instantiated in 
sensorimotor areas. However, as indicated above, according to an 
enactivist view, language comprehension consists in the context-
bound employment of sensorimotor skills, rather than in the search 
for cognitivist representations. On an enactivist account, blocking 
activation of motor or premotor areas associated with the specific 
action mentioned in an utterance thus need not impede under-
standing when language comprehension is subserved by sensorimo-
tor activation other than re-enactment or pre-enactment.
It is important to stress that the emphasis on context sen-
sitivity is not intended to simply replace standard accounts of 
context sensitive language understanding, such as Grice’s theory 
of conversational implicatures (Grice, 1989). Grice’s account of 
context sensitive language use identifies principles and maxims 
that describe the various ways in which context is taken into 
account when uttering and understanding sentences. Cognitivist 
approaches to language understanding, specifically those of a non-
embodied kind, typically take these principles and maxims to be 
implemented in our cognitive architecture. But nothing in Grice’s 
theory implies this. On our view, we should be very careful in dis-
tinguishing levels of description here (cf. Dennett, 1969; Bennet 
and Hacker, 2003) and resist the tendency to explain personal-
level cognitive phenomena in terms of isomorphic brain-level 
processes. On an enactive view on context sensitive language 
understanding,  Grice’s  principles  and  maxims  that  describe 
conversational implicatures model real life linguistic interaction. 
That is, such interactions are not governed by these principles and 
maxims. Rather they are informatively described by them, possibly 
in a slightly idealized way.
A related issue is the question whether a context needs to be 
represented, in order to be effective. The question “what would 
you like for dinner?” has different implications for action and is 
hence understood differently when sitting in a restaurant and when 
walking in a supermarket with your partner. When a given context 
is taken into account in understanding a sentence, can it not be said 
that the hearer somehow represents this context? On an enactive 
view, taking a context into account means that the context is rel-
evant to specific perception–action couplings. In an innocent but 
uninformative way, this means that if one responds appropriately 
in a given situation, the context is represented accurately. But that 
does not mean, enactivists would stress, that such couplings are 
co-determined by a discrete representation of the context that is 
causally operative in bringing about one type of coupling rather 
than another. In fact, the situation itself is already part of the enac-
tive process of perceiving and acting in the world, and thus there 
is no need to suppose the representation of the context. Context 
sensitivity, then, need not imply the kind of representationalism 
that is characteristic of cognitivism.www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 234  |  7
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conclusIon
We conclude that an embodied approach to language comprehen-
sion in cognitive neuroscience requires an enactivist rather than a 
cognitivist conception of embodied cognition. An enactivist para-
digm allows us to make sense of more of the cognitive neurosci-
entific data relating language comprehension to action effects or 
modality specific neural processing than a cognitivist paradigm by 
including sensorimotor activations that cannot be subsumed under 
the heading of (p)re-enactment. Also, the enactivist paradigm more 
easily allows for the context-dependence of language comprehen-
sion. Finally and most importantly, an enactivist conception allows 
us to answer two of the most serious objections to an embodied 
account of language comprehension, the necessity question and the 
simulation constraint. In conclusion, the multidisciplinary evidence 
relating language comprehension to sensorimotor activity, argues 
for an enactivist conception of language. Language comprehension 
reflects the employment of sensorimotor skills and is a context-
bound phenomenon that is dependent on the relation between the 
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Although an in-depth discussion of these concerns is beyond 
the scope of the present paper, we would like to point out that a 
cognitivist embodied account of systematicity and productivity 
runs into the same problems as mentioned before. With respect 
to the simulation constraint, it remains unclear how it is possible 
to make inferences about concepts for which we lack the relevant 
simulations. In addition, when it comes to conceptual combina-
tion it remains unclear how combined concepts are understood, 
whose sensorimotor properties cannot be inferred on the basis 
of their constituent concepts (e.g., a “wooden spoon” is typically 
conceived as big, whereas neither the concept “wood” or “spoon” 
implies this property).
ImplIcatIons for futurE rEsEarch
In the final section of this paper the implications of an extended 
approach to language for future research will be discussed. As 
argued before, the enactive view can accommodate research find-
ings that are difficult to reconcile with a simulationist interpreta-
tion of embodiment. In addition, the enactive view provides an 
important break from previous attempts aimed at determining the 
necessity of neural resonance for language understanding. Rather 
than focusing on the nature of linguistic representations, research 
should consider under what conditions and in which contexts 
language processing is accompanied by activation in modality-
specific brain areas. We would like to suggest possible directions 
for future research on the functional role of neural resonance in 
language processing.
First, according to the enactive view language is primarily used 
for action and accordingly, motor activation in association with 
language processing should be considered in relation to its poten-
tial for action. In line with this suggestion, several studies have 
shown direct effects of language processing on motor perform-
ance (Boulenger et al., 2008; Nazir et al., 2008; Frak et al., 2010) 
or from action preparation on language processing (Lindemann 
et al., 2006; van Elk et al., 2008; van Elk et al., 2009b). Moreover, the 
enactive approach predicts that interactions between language and 
action are not restricted to relatively simple reaching and grasp-
ing movements, but extend to naturalistic action settings as well. 
One intriguing possibility would be to investigate the functional 
role of effects of language on action in a communicative setting 
for instance (e.g., such as when someone asks you to pass the salt 
across the table).
Second, the enactive view implies that the coupling between 
language and action is flexible and context-dependent. In contrast, 
embodied accounts of language processing have suggested that the 
coupling between language and action is obligatory and that the 
motor system is activated within the first few 100 ms after word 
onset (e.g., Pulvermuller et al., 2005). According to an enactive view, 
rather than being automatic, the activation of motor-related areas Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    December 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 234  |  8
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